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Abstract
Almost all known secret sharing schemes work on numbers. Such methods will have
difficulty in sharing graphs since the number of graphs increases exponentially with
the number of nodes. We propose a secret sharing scheme for graphs where we use
graph intersection for reconstructing the secret which is hidden as a sub graph in the
shares. Our method does not rely on heavy computational operations such as modu-
lar arithmetic or polynomial interpolation but makes use of very basic operations like
assignment and checking for equality, and graph intersection can also be performed vi-
sually. In certain cases, the secret could be reconstructed using just pencil and paper by
authorised parties but cannot be broken by an adversary even with unbounded compu-
tational power. The method achieves perfect secrecy for (2, n) scheme and requires far
fewer operations compared to Shamir’s algorithm. The proposed method could be used
to share objects such as matrices, sets, plain text and even a heterogeneous collection of
these. Since we do not require a previously agreed upon encoding scheme, the method
is very suitable for sharing heterogeneous collection of objects in a dynamic fashion.
Keywords: cryptography, graph, secret sharing, set intersection
1 Introduction
Secrets have to be kept secret. At times, we may choose certain people to be privy
to the whole secret. At times, we may also want it in such a way that a secret has
to be shared among a number of people and any set with a desired number of people
from them can unlock the secret. In secret sharing terminology, this ‘desired number’
is called threshold. If the number of people is n and threshold is k, the scheme is
called a (k, n) scheme. It also has the property that any number of people less than the
threshold (< k) will be unable to reconstruct the secret. The whole problem of secret
sharing has drawn considerable attention from researchers; the large variety of secret
sharing schemes available today testifies as to this; [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] to name a few.
Shamir’s scheme [1] and most other secret sharing schemes assume (without stating
explicitly) that every secret could be represented as a number and shared according to
a threshold scheme. However, we come across such scenarios wherein the secret to be
shared is not a number, but an object. Then, encoding the secret to a number and
decoding it back upon reconstruction can become a tedious task.
Here, the term object is intended to mean a piece of information manifested in some
convenient form. It could be one of (but not limited to) the following: a set, a matrix, a
graph or a data structure defined over numbers, characters, bytes or even raw symbols
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(which may or may not carry any meaning). It can also be a heterogeneous collection
of these. For example, a person may keep as secret his username (string of alphabets),
account number (an integer), bank balance (a floating point number), password (which
in itself may contain numbers, alphabets and special symbols) and a map to some
secret destination (which may be a graph) all together. If the person wants to share
this heterogeneous secret set, how should he go about doing it?
Consider the case where the secret to be shared is a graph of a fixed number of
vertices n (n is publicly known). Then, there are 2
nC2 different graphs possible, the
secret being one of them. The scenario could be one in which a file is compressed using
a Huffman tree. Only with the tree can one decode the compressed file. Then, it is
reasonable that the file be publicly available and the Huffman tree, a secret to be shared
among a set of people. Large amount of information such as a protein structure or the
class diagram of a complex system or the circuit diagram of VLSI may be modelled as
graphs ([7], [10], [11]) and there could arise a need for them to be shared according to
some threshold secret sharing scheme among a set of people in a convenient fashion.
Other examples include cartographic and demographic applications.
In this paper, we propose a new secret sharing algorithm for graphs. The secret
graph is treated as a sub graph in each of the shares and reconstruction of the secrets is
achieved by intersection of graphs. Graph intersection can also be performed visually
and hence our method does not rely on heavy computational operations such as modular
arithmetic and polynomial interpolation like conventional secret sharing algorithms.
The problem of encoding graphs into numbers is eliminated in our method since we
directly deal with graphs for generation of shares and for reconstruction of the secret.
We propose a (2, n) threshold scheme and claim that our method is perfectly secure as
no information of the secret is revealed by the shares. Computationally, our method
outperforms Shamir’s scheme for sharing graphs. For sharing passwords of length 8,
one can encode it into a graph with as less as 11 nodes and use our proposed algorithm.
This demonstrates the practical value of the proposed algorithm.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the prevalent problems with the
existing schemes. In the next section, we introduce the basic idea of our algorithm
using a simple example. Then, we go on to explain how the same idea applies to graphs.
The following section deals deals the security aspects of the proposed scheme followed
by complexity analysis of the algorithm. Thereafter we enumerate the advantages our
scheme has over existing schemes. We end by listing the drawbacks of the scheme.
Although we propose possible solutions, much of it is left for future research.
2 Problems with existing schemes
First, let us see what it takes to share an object using existing secret sharing schemes.
Apart from Visual cryptography [5], to the best of our knowledge, all secret sharing
schemes share only integers. They work on the assumption that the data to be shared
is (or can be made) a number [1]. However, they fail to address the task of encoding
and decoding (see Figure 1), which can be quite tedious in certain scenarios.
The major problems with using existing schemes such as Shamir’s [1] in scenarios
such as those mentioned earlier are enumerated below:
1. Two extra steps are required, viz., encoding while creating shares and decoding
after reconstruction from shares. Let us examine what we mean by encoding,
in this context. The secret to be shared could be an object like graph, set etc.
During encoding, we are defining a mapping for that object to an integer.
Suppose we have a set of names {Ram, Jai, Sri, Dev}. We assign numbers to
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Figure 1: Secret Sharing Scheme (3, n)
each of them uniquely, say, Ram = 2, Jai = 3, Sri = 6, and Dev = 8. Thus,
whenever we want to communicate one of these names, we use the corresponding
number. The party at the other end of the communication channel looks up the
number-name mapping (which we assume is publicly available and not a secret)
and retrieves the intended name.
Here, it seems easier with small numbers being used for (comparatively) larger
names. However, an encoding of Ram = 1762536123197, Jai = 1042352443225,
Sri = 3562716934352 and Dev = 1265460383679 would be cumbersome. We come
across such scenarios where existing methods actually force us to take up such
encoding schemes. We shall soon give an example where we have to encode a
large number of objects into numbers.
2. Graphs such as those with around 100 nodes need 4950 bits for their representa-
tion. Let us observe how this is so:
For counting’s sake, we consider choosing an edge the same as choosing two nodes,
both being equivalent. Thus for an n-node graph, there are nC2 ways by which
an edge could be picked. Each of these edges may or may not be part of a graph
formed by these n nodes. Thus, there is a total of 2
nC2 possible graphs in n nodes.
For n = 100, this number is 24950 (which has approximately 1490 digits). Thus
we will be dealing with 4950 bit integers for representing each of these graphs if
at all we are encoding them. Most secret sharing techniques ([1], [4]) use prime
numbers and have to do complex calculations involving modular arithmetic and
polynomial interpolation. Finding primes as large as this is also not a trivial task.
Even for smaller graphs, since the bit requirement grows in a quadratic fashion,
O(n2), it becomes more and more difficult to find large primes as n increases.
Also, the increase in the number of bits processed increases the complexity of
interpolation and other calculations such as encoding, creating shares, decoding
etc.
3. In scenarios involving protein structure, such as residue based packing motifs [7] or
protein-protein interaction [9] etc., it is reasonable to expect graphs with number
of nodes in thousands [10]. Needless to say, dealing with them using the existing
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methods is quite difficult.
4. Existing schemes are bound to operate within certain constraints. Shamir’s
scheme requires a finite field Zp to work and hence large primes. The scheme
in [4] is seen to fail in certain cases (illustrated in [6]) owing to its dependence on
polynomial interpolation for implementation. Visual cryptography [5], although
is devoid of complex calculations and primes, requires a high resolution image of
the secret, a device to create shares etc. What is desirable is a scheme which
would work with or without the use of computers and does not involve too much
of calculations.
5. If we could come up with a scheme to share graphs it would be useful in other
ways also. For instance, we all use passwords somewhere or the other. Here we
consider 8-length alphanumeric case sensitive passwords. The total set to choose
from is thus composed of 26 lower case letters, 26 upper case letters and 10 digits,
summing up to 62. Therefore, the total number of possible passwords turns out to
be 628, which is approximately 247.6. Thus, rather than encoding the passwords
into integers and working on primes as large as this, we can encode them into
graphs with 11 nodes. Doing the calculation in previous lines shows that this
accounts for 255 different graphs, hence 55 bits. Here, although we have to use
55 bits where there is only a requirement for 48 bits, we do have a number of
advantages, not having to deal with large primes being one of them. We treat the
55 bit number as a stream of bits (meaningful when interpreted as a graph) rather
than a whole number. This helps to avoid the need to deal with large primes. We
enumerate the advantages in a later section.
3 An algorithm using set intersection
We illustrate a simple yet effective secret sharing algorithm using set operation.
Suppose the secret to be shared is a set of integers, S = {0, 2, 13}. S is to be shared
among 5 people in such a way that if any 3 of them come together, S could be recon-
structed. It is thus a (3, 5) scheme. We intend to achieve this using set intersection.
Thus, the shares are created as:
Share s1 = {−48,−25,−18,−5, 0, 1, 2, 9, 10, 13, 19, 24, 40, 52, 88}
Share s2 = {−92,−48,−18,−3, 0, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 37, 61, 90}
Share s3 = {−75,−53,−44,−25,−10,−3, 0, 1, 2, 11, 13, 40, 46, 58, 61}
Share s4 = {−81,−75,−44,−10,−5, 0, 2, 3, 12, 13, 23, 24, 50, 52, 90}
Share s5 = {−92,−81,−53, 0, 2, 4, 9, 13, 19, 23, 37, 46, 50, 58, 88}
We shall soon explain how these shares are created. The secret set, S could be
reconstructed by performing set intersection operation on three or more of the shares.
Intersection here means to pick the common elements. To take the intersection of two
sets, say, A and B, is to choose only those elements which are in A as well as in B. For
intersection of three sets, A, B and C, we may either
1. Pick all those elements which are in A as well as B as well as C, or,
2. Take intersection of A and B and then intersect this result with C.
The same applies for higher number of set intersections as well. Here, for recon-
structing S, we need to intersect any three of the shares, since it is a (3, 5) scheme.
However, intersection of two shares does not reveal S. For example, intersection of
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shares s2 and s3 results in a set, {−3, 0, 2, 11, 13, 61}. Only when this set is intersected
with any one of the other three shares do we get S.
Clearly, it is possible to perform reconstruction of the secret even without the use
of any computing device. It could easily be carried out by a layman visually; may
be called pencil and paper secret sharing. However, it can be done using a computer
algorithm as well. Now we formally describe how shares are created for a (3, n) scheme.
We assume that the cardinality of the secret set to be shared is publicly known and is
taken to be u. We also assume a source that gives distinct random values.
Algorithm for creating shares
1. Create n sets (which are going to be the shares), add the elements in the secret
to all of these and mark the elements.
2. For each share si, 1 ≤ i ≤ (n− 1), do the following:
(a) Add (n− i).u elements at random to the share si.
(b) For each share sj , j > i, do:
i. Randomly pick u unmarked elements from share si and mark them.
ii. Add these u elements to sj and mark them.
3. STOP.
Let us see how shares were created for the secret set S = {0, 2, 13} using the algorithm
for a (3, 5) scheme.
n = 5, u = 3.
1. 5 shares, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5 each containing S, are created.
2. To the set s1, (n−i).u = 12 random values (−48,−25,−18,−5, 1, 9, 10, 19, 24, 40, 52, 88)
are added.
3. u distinct elements from this set are added to each of the shares s2, s3, s4, s5.
(−48,−18, 10) are added to s2.
(−25, 1, 40) are added to s3.
(−5, 24, 52) are added to s4.
(9, 19, 88) are added to s5.
4. To the set s2, (n − i).u = 9 random values (−92,−3, 3, 4, 11, 12, 37, 61, 90) are
added.
5. u distinct elements from this set are added to each of the shares s3, s4, s5.
(−3, 11, 61) are added to s3.
(3, 12, 90) are added to s4.
(−92, 4, 37) are added to s5.
6. To the set s3, (n− i).u = 6 random values (−75,−53,−44,−10, 46, 58) are added.
7. u distinct elements from this set are added to each of the shares s4, s5.
(−75,−44,−10) are added to s4.
(−53, 46, 58) are added to s5.
8. To the set s4, (n− i).u = 3 random values (−81, 23, 50) are added.
9. u distinct elements from this set are added to share s5.
(−81, 23, 50) are added to s5.
10. To the set s5, nothing more is added since (n− i).u = 0.
Now, all the shares have n.u = 15 elements each.
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Drawbacks of set intersection algorithm
The set intersection is not perfectly secure. In this context, perfect secrecy means to
ensure that all possible secrets could be constructed out of a given share. The shares
created in the set intersection algorithm give away information about what all secrets
are possible and what all are not. For example, by looking at the share s1, one can say
that the set {1, 2, 3} is not the secret.
4 A new algorithm for sharing graphs
For sharing graphs, the same algorithm could be modified to attain a perfectly secure
scheme. We shall propose a (2, n) scheme here. The algorithm for creating shares is
described as follows:
First we create a single share from the secret and copy it n times and modify each
share a little.
Algorithm: create share()
1. Read the secret graph to be shared; it has c nodes.
2. Add b extra nodes to the existing secret graph on c nodes.
3. Connect them to the graph as well as among themselves in a random fashion.
4. Create n copies of the resulting graph and relabel the nodes of each of the shares
in such a way that the nodes which are part of the secret get the same label and
all others different. It should also be ensured that the nodes which are part of
the secret sub graph get labels in the same lexicographic order as in the secret.
(Same lexicographic order means, for example, a graph with nodes a, b, c may be
labelled 12, 25, 52 respectively but not 12, 52, 25 respectively).
5. If the list Le contains the list of edges in the secret sub graph in each share, for
each share do the following:
(a) Randomly decide whether to skip the next (sub)step or not.
(b) Add new edges, which are not in Le, to the secret sub graph and append this
new list of edges to Le.
(c) Randomly pick c nodes. If it contains a nodes which are part of the secret,
i. If the a nodes are not all mutually connected, pick new a nodes.
ii. Else, if at least one of all possible edges between the a nodes are present
in Le, pick new a nodes.
iii. Else, continue.
(d) Create a complete graph on the c nodes thus picked.
6. STOP.
The scheme works basically by mixing additional irrelevant data from the same do-
main as the secret, with the secret to be shared. Now, let us see how reconstruction of
the secret graph takes place.
Algorithm: reconstruct()
1. Input 2 shares which are graphs on b+ c nodes.
2. Perform set intersection of nodes (sub routine for set intersection follows) to get
a graph on c nodes.
3. Check for edges common to each of the shares and construct the c node graph.
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4. Relabel the resulting graph so as to invert step 4 in create share(). For exam-
ple, the labels of resulting graph 12, 25 and 52 correspond to a, b and c respectively.
Intersection of nodes can be described by the following algorithm:
Let the node set of the two shares for intersection be represented as arrays, A and
B and the result be added to C. We assume that the arrays are sorted. This is a
reasonable assumption to make since the set containing the nodes could be created out
of the adjacency matrix representing the graph.
Algorithm: set intersection()
1. i = 1, j = 1, k = 1.
2. Until i ≤ N as well as j ≤ N holds, do the following:
(a) If A[i] = B[j], do:
i. Add A[i] to C[k].
ii. Increment i, j, k.
(b) Else if A[i] < B[j], increment i.
(c) Else if A[i] > B[j], increment j.
3. STOP.
Figure 2 enumerates possible secrets on 3 nodes, one each with 0, 1, 2 and 3 edges.
However, in practice, we distinguish between the three possible graphs with 2 edges as
well as the three possible graphs with 1 edge. The shares generated for these secrets
for a (2, 3) scheme are also shown in Figures 4 and 5.
Proof of Security for a (2, n) scheme
In Shannon’s seminal paper [12], perfect secrecy is defined by a necessary and sufficient
condition that, for all cryptograms E the a posteriori probabilities are equal to the a
priori probabilities independently of the values of these.
To put it mathematically,
PE(M) = P (M)
where, PE(M) is the a posteriori probability of message M if cryptogram E is inter-
cepted and, P (M) the a priori probability of message M .
An ideal (k, n) secret sharing scheme is one in which no information about the secret
is gained from one share or more than one share upto k − 1 shares. Such a scheme is
said to be perfectly secure. Adopting Shannon’s definition to secret sharing, perfect
secrecy could be said to have been achieved in a (2, n) scheme if and only if,
PS(D0) = P (D0)
where, PS(D0) is the probability of D0 being the secret given a single share S (a
posteriori probability) and, P (D0) the a priori probability of D0 being the secret.
Now, let us observe how our algorithm for sharing graphs under a (2, n) scheme
provides perfect secrecy. Assume that the secret to be shared is an c-node graph, Gc.
Then, the a priori probability of Gc is given by:
P (Gc) =
1
Total no. of c-node graphs possible
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Figure 2: Possible graphs on 3 nodes without taking into account, the labels. With labels,
the number is 8.
P (Gc) =
1
2
cC2
The shares are constructed in such a way that (see Algorithm create share) all the
shares contain within them a complete graph Cc on c nodes. Let Eg be the edge-set of
the secret graph Gc, the edge-set of the share be Es and Ec the edge-set of the complete
graph Cc. Then,
Es = Ec + Er
where Er is the set of edges in the share excluding the complete graph Cc.
Es = Eg + (Ec − Eg) + Er.
Ec could be viewed as Eg + (Ec − Eg) since the edge set of a graph on c-nodes is
always a subset (may be proper or not) of a complete graph on c-nodes.
Thus, a given share could be seen as a decomposition into any secret(on c nodes)
and the remaining edges in all possible ways. i.e.,
|Es| = |Eg|+ (|Ec| − |Eg|) + |Er|
where |A| stands for the cardinality of the set A.
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Figure 3: Shares which gives away information
|Es| = 0 + (2
cC2 − 0) + |Er|. Here the secret is the c-node graph with no edge.
|Es| = 1 + (2
cC2 − 1) + |Er|. Here the secret is the c-node graph with 1 edge.
...
...
|Es| = 2
cC2 + (2
cC2 − 2
cC2) + |Er|. Here the secret is the complete c-node graph.
Thus, given a single share, it is equally possible that it holds within it any of the
possible 2
cC2 c-node graphs. In other words, keeping one share constant and by varying
the second share it is possible to generate all possible secrets on c nodes. This is by
virtue of construction of shares. During construction (Algorithm create share), edges
were added irrespective of the graph we are sharing as a secret. Thus, the number of
times each possible sub graph (on c nodes) occurs in the share has nothing to do with
the probability of that sub graph being the secret. Therefore, a posteriori probability
of the secret Gc given a share S is given by:
PS(Gc) =
1
2
cC2
Since, the a posteriori probability equals the a priori probability, the proposed (2, n)
scheme is perfectly secure. Note that the secret need not always be present inside the
complete sub graph itself. It may be hidden elsewhere also. This is decided randomly
in the algorithm. However, the presence of complete sub graph ensures the possibility
of all secrets at least once.
Security Analysis
Here, we analyze the security aspects of the proposed algorithm including an attempt
to break it. In this context, breaking means to try to gain some knowledge about the
secret given a particular share (since less than k means only one share, for a (2, n)
scheme). We will show that the opponent gains absolutely no information about the
secret by analyzing a share.
Let us first consider the case of a secret with 3 nodes. So, there are 2
3C2 = 8 choices
for the secret. Thus, the brute force search involves going through all the 8 choices.
Now, to share the secret, we apply the algorithm with b = 2. i.e., we add 2 nodes
to the secret to create shares. We assume that the number of nodes in the secret is
publicly known. Thus, brute force involves choosing 3 nodes from the 5 node graph
9
(a) Above: A 3 node secret. Below: 3 shares for the secret.
(b) Above: A 3 node secret. Below: 3 shares for the secret.
Figure 4: 3 node secrets with 2 edges and 1 edge and possible set of shares for (2, 3) scheme
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(a) Above: A 3 node secret. Below: 3 shares for the secret.
(b) Above: A 3 node secret. Below: 3 shares for the secret.
Figure 5: 3 node secrets with no edge and 3 edges and possible set of shares for (2, 3)
scheme
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which is a share. This amounts to a total of 5C3 = 10 choices. Clearly, this is greater
than the brute force search.
One other possible mode of attack is to analyze the share with respect to edges
rather than nodes. Then, it can so result that some graphs are not possible to be the
secret, given a share. Figure 3 shows two such shares (of different secrets). Given that
the secret is a 3-node graph, looking at the share on the left, one can be sure that the
complete graph on 3 nodes is not the secret, because there is no complete sub graph in
it and that the share on the right is not a share for either a complete graph or a graph
on 2 nodes, because it has neither as sub graphs. It is to circumvent such a problem
that we included the two important steps in the algorithm for creating shares, namely,
• Adding edges to the secret sub graph
• Ensuring the presence of a complete graph
Thus, over the whole set of choices of 3 nodes taken in the manner described earlier,
the opponent finds that all possible graphs on 3 nodes including the complete graph
could be the secret. i.e., all possible 3-node graphs are present somewhere in each of
the 5-node share that all of them are equally likely to be the secret. This is because
the complete graph can generate all possible graphs on 3 nodes upon intersection with
another share. Thus, the opponent gains absolutely no information about the secret.
There could be a share like the one in Figure 6 in all the cases. i.e., given this share
it is possible that it be generated from any of the possible 3-node graphs. Although
this is true for all the shares, we created the same share for all secrets deliberately so
that our claim becomes obvious enough.
Figure 6: A graph which is a share for all secret graphs on 3 nodes shown
So, from the example above, it can be seen that perfect security is provided by
ensuring that there is a complete graph on 3 nodes within each secret and choosing the
number of nodes to be added in such a way that 5C3 ≥ 2
3C2 . In general, if the secret
has c nodes and b nodes are added to it while creating the share, to thwart brute force
attack, the necessary condition is that:
b+cCc ≥ 2
cC2 (1)
Thus, the number of nodes to be added (the value b) is determined by the above
expression. Note that we claim perfect security for (2, n) scheme for graphs because
k − 1 = 1 and information gained from k − 1 shares is equal to the information gained
from one share.
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For still larger graphs with 10000 nodes or so, the search space grows sufficiently
large that it provides computational security with a few nodes added although not
perfect security. However, note that we cannot do a direct comparison between the
search space presented by our scheme and brute force search space to calculate the
number of nodes to be added like we did for 3 node graphs, since the total number of
possible graphs is of the order of 249995000.
Complexity Analysis
The scheme we propose makes reconstruction of the secret less complex instead of
share generation. Since share generation is a one-time process, it is reasonable that
it be complex in lieu of reconstruction which happens more frequently. However, the
whole process of creating shares is completed in polynomial time only. Reconstruction
is easier still; of the order of N(N , number of nodes in the share). Let N = b+ c and
number of shares to be created, n.
1. Adding nodes : This step of adding nodes is of the order of number of nodes N .
2. Adding edges : Adding edges is of the order of N2. i.e., O(N2).
3. Relabeling: Relabeling is of the order of number of nodes N , times the number of
shares n. i.e., O(N2).
4. Adding a complete sub graph: Creating a complete sub graph is O(N2). This has
to be performed for each of the n shares. Thus, the whole step is of the order of
O(N3).
Thus, it is clear that share generation can be carried out in polynomial time. Re-
construction of secret involves set intersection which can be done in O(N) and edge
intersection of the resulting set of secret nodes, O(c2). Since the number of nodes in the
secret is much smaller than N always (by Equation 1), the algorithm for reconstruction
could be considered to run in O(N).
However, complexity of attack turns out to be of factorial order. If a share has
N nodes and secret is known to have c nodes, picking the possible secret nodes itself
is O(N !). This is because such a picking could be done in NCc ways. Thus, clearly
an attack is far difficult compared to share generation and reconstruction, in terms of
complexity as well.
Initially, we have just the number of nodes in the secret c to begin with. But, we
have defined complexity in terms of N , to which c is related in an exponential manner.
However, the above analysis serves to compare the complexities of share generation,
reconstruction and attack. In the next section, we observe how our scheme is better
than one of the conventional schemes in terms of computational complexity.
A comparison with Shamir’s scheme
Let us take a closer look at the complexity using the example of 8-length alphanumeric
passwords discussed in an earlier section (Section 2). Total number of possible pass-
words turns out to be 628, which is approximately 247.6.
Using graph algorithm: We can encode the 247.6 passwords into graphs with 11
nodes since the possible no. of graphs on 11 nodes is 255. We have to use Equation 1
for calculating the number of nodes to be added. However, since the brute force search
space for passwords is 247.6, we substitute the same in the RHS of the equation and
get that we have to add 93 nodes so that 104C11 ≥ 2
47.6. For a (2, n) scheme, assigning
new labels is done a total of 93.n+11 times (different labels for the newly added nodes
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and same label for nodes in the secret). Picking 11 nodes and completing the subgraph
requires 55 operations for one share and 55.n for n shares. Reconstruction can happen
in just 104+ 55 = 159 steps (104 for intersection of nodes and 55 for checking intersec-
tion of all possible edges on 11 node graph just resulted).
Using Shamir’s scheme: For a (2, n) scheme, Shamir’s scheme [1] involves solving
a system with 2 linear equations and 2 variables. For example, say, the 2 shares are
(xi, q(xi)) and (xj , q(xj)), then:
q(xi) = a0 + a1xi (modp),
q(xj) = a0 + a1xj (modp).
In matrix form, the solution is given as:
[
a0
a1
]
=
[
1 xi
1 xj
]
−1
·
[
q(xi)
q(xj)
]
(modp),
where a0 is the secret. Thus, reconstruction of the secret involves taking multiplica-
tive inverse over a finite field which is O(n3) where n is the no. of bits which in this
case is 48.
Thus it can be seen that our algorithm requires 159 basic operations as opposed
to Shamir’s which approximately requires 483 = 110592 basic operations on an av-
erage. Our method relies on two basic operations namely assignment and checking
for equality. But, Shamir’s scheme requires addition and multiplication over a prime
modulus for creation of shares and addition, multiplication and taking inverse over the
prime modulus for reconstruction. This explains why our algorithm is much faster than
Shamir’s.
5 Advantages over conventional schemes
1. Since our method only relies on intersection of sets, there is no requirement for a
previously agreed upon encoding scheme among the parties. Existing secret shar-
ing schemes in literature invariably assume that the parties who are sharing the
secret object have agreed upon a common encoding scheme. Our method circum-
vents this problem. This enables enormous flexibility for sharing heterogeneous
collection of objects in a dynamic fashion.
2. Although encoding graphs into numbers may be considered a triviality, every
digital information being already encoded, one advantage our method offers is
that we do not have to deal with the resulting bit stream as whole number(s). In
our method, the stream of bits needs to be interpreted only as a graph in order
for it to be shared as a secret unlike in conventional schemes wherein the stream
of bits resulting out of encoding has to be treated as a whole number or a set of
whole numbers (in case the bit stream is chopped down).
3. Our method does not require prime numbers for implementation.
4. Unlike in [1], [2], [3], [4], no complex operations such as polynomial interpolation,
matrix multiplication, solving a system of linear equations or those involving cum-
bersome modular arithmetic such as finding multiplicative inverses are required.
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5. Our reconstruction method does not require computational resources or knowledge
of complicated mathematical operations. Given sufficient number of shares, a
layman can reconstruct the secret graph. No mathematical knowledge is assumed,
just the intuitive ability to pick common elements from two given sets. Such
a feature is found in Visual cryptography ([5]). However, Visual cryptography
requires shares to be printed on transparencies which need to be aligned perfectly
for reconstruction.
6. In certain cases, our method has the advantage of visual decoding. i.e., we do not
require any calculating devices or computers. It is notable that this is achieved
while retaining information theoretic security.
7. The same share may be used for sharing two different secrets (may or may not
be from the same domain). In such a scheme, the elements corresponding to one
secret become the items eliminated on intersection for the other secret and vice
versa.
8. The scheme works basically by mixing additional irrelevant data with the secret
to be shared. We can also implement the scheme in such a way that the irrelevant
data mixed come from a variety of domains. For example, a share for a secret
string may consist of a number of strings, numbers, matrices, sets and symbols.
In that case, the parties with the secret shares do not even know what kind of
object is being shared. Only during the time of reconstruction, this information
is revealed. This is implemented identical to the sharing of a secret set discussed
in Section 3.
9. In Shamir’s scheme, even if there occurs a 1 bit error somewhere in the k shares
used for reconstruction, it fails. However, our scheme designed with inherent
redundancy is robust enough to work in conditions of error worse than the one
mentioned.
6 Drawbacks and possible solutions
1. Since our algorithm does not take into account specific attributes that determine
how a graph from a particular domain would look, there could be some methods
to attack it. For example, when every node of the graph represents a distinct
amino acid residue in a protein and has the residue type as its label [7], looking at
a share, a domain expert might be able to say that such a bond between molecules
is not possible and hence the edge could be removed. The secret, in these cases
would be graphs with upto 300 nodes [8]. Thus, this could be seen as a way to
attack the scheme in that domain. Since, shares are created at random, we do not
take into account the feasibility of a particular edge in the underlying domain.
However, consulting domain knowledge while constructing shares can solve this
problem although then, creation of shares needs to be carried out with greater
care.
2. An ideal (k, n) secret sharing scheme is one in which the information gained from
more than one share or even k − 1 shares must be equal to that gained from one
share. Although our scheme satisfies this for (2, n) trivially, for (3, n) schemes,
this is not achieved. However, we can choose the amount of extra information
to be added in such a way that the effort required to isolate the secret out of
information gathered by pooling together (k − 1) shares is still greater than that
of the brute force approach.
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7 Conclusion
We conclude by observing that existing secret sharing algorithms implicitly assume
that the secret to be shared is encoded in to a number (with the exception of Visual
cryptography). Such an encoding is not only difficult for sharing graphs but also re-
quires public knowledge of the encoding scheme. Our method of sharing graphs works
directly with graphs and encoding into numbers is eliminated. Further, our method
has the advantage of visual reconstruction of the secret for small graphs since we use
graph intersection unlike conventional techniques which rely on modular arithmetic and
polynomial interpolation. What we propose could be thought of as a pencil and paper
secret sharing scheme which could be used even by a layman with no mathematical ex-
pertise nonetheless. As an example, 8-length passwords which are very common, can be
conveniently shared using our approach. Computation-wise, we make use of two basic
operations namely, assignment and checking for equality and our scheme outperforms
Shamir’s scheme while retaining perfect secrecy.
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